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Abstract Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) provides a framework for
judging the ethical qualities of innovation processes, however guidance for
researchers on how to implement such practices is limited. Exploring RRI in the
context of nanotechnology, this paper examines how the dispersed and interdisci-
plinary nature of the nanotechnology field somewhat hampers the abilities of
individual researchers to control the innovation process. The ad-hoc nature of the
field of nanotechnology, with its fluid boundaries and elusive membership, has thus
far failed to establish a strong collective agent, such as a professional organization,
through which researchers could collectively steer technological development in
light of social and environmental needs. In this case, individual researchers cannot
innovate responsibly purely by themselves, but there is also no structural framework
to ensure that responsible development of nanotechnologies takes place. We argue
that, in such a case, individual researchers have a duty to collectivize. In short,
researchers in situations where it is challenging for individual agents to achieve the
goals of RRI are compelled to develop organizations to facilitate RRI. In this paper
we establish and discuss the criteria under which individual researchers have this
duty to collectivize.
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Introduction
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) is emerging as one of the leading
paradigms for discussions concerning the governance of new technologies. Broadly
speaking, research and innovation following the RRI praxis should lead to the
development of technologies that promote social and environmental values (Owen
et al. 2013; Van den Hoven 2013), and respond to the grand challenges of our time
(von Schomberg 2013). While few engineers and scientists would disagree with the
goals of incorporating social and environmental values into research and innovation,
how to accomplish such lofty goals is not so clear. Consider technological
innovations that are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. In the early
stages of development it is difficult to predict the impacts of the technology,
whereas in later stages the ramifications may be more difficult to rectify due to
entrenchment and technological lock-in (Collingridge 1981). Scholars involved in
the discussion concerning RRI aspire to provide an answer to this ‘dilemma of
control’ by developing RRI as a framework that is both flexible and responsive, in
order to be able to adapt to new (scientific) information and changing ethical
perspectives on technological impacts (Alfred Nordmann 2014; Owen et al. 2013).
RRI is characterized by a shift from assessing the desirability of the outcome of
innovation processes, such as evaluating harmful product outcomes in court under
liability law, to assessing the qualities of the innovation process. Drawing heavily on
ideas like constructive technology assessment (Rip and Te Kulve 2008), midstream
modulation (Fisher et al. 2006; Schuurbiers 2011) and anticipatory governance
(Guston 2013; Sarewitz 2011), several authors have proposed methodologies for
assessing the responsibility of research and innovation. The RRI paradigm proposed
by Stilgoe, Owen, Macnagten and their colleagues has four dimensions (Owen et al.
2013; Stilgoe et al. 2013). They propose that research should be: anticipatory,
exploring in advance and anticipating potential technological impacts; reflective, by
examining goals and purposes of technologies as well as the uncertainties in risk
assessment; deliberative, the idea that public and diverse stakeholders’ perspectives
are actively considered during design processes and, lastly; responsive, the actual
alteration and shaping of technological trajectories in response to deliberation and
reflection. van den Hoven (2013, 2009) proposes Value Sensitive Design as a
methodology for RRI; conceptual and empirical research with the aim of value
identification, and a value-directed design methodology would be needed in order to
make innovation more responsible. Van de Poel writes about the responsibility of
innovation processes in terms of responsible experimentation (2009, 2011). Since
research and innovation in new and emerging technological fields are prone to
uncertainty, we should perceive them as forms of social experimentation. Van de
Poel argues that such experiments should be governed by normative requirements
drawn from the realm of bioethics and medical experimentation.
The process orientation that is integral to RRI is predicated on some form of
organization. The abovementioned approaches all assume that technological
development trajectories are actively steered in light of new information perspec-
tives on technological risks, or other socially or environmentally undesirable
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impacts. This is a core tenet of RRI. It follows that we must then ask: who is
actually doing RRI? Processes cannot be responsible, nor can they reflect on or
account for what they do and make intentional choices. In the end, responsibility
should rest with a particular agent. RRI refers to a collection of individual agents
that perceive, reflect, and act together in such a way that this leads to technologies
being designed with certain values in mind. While it may make sense to set process
level requirements when designing a governance structure, when it comes down to
allocating responsibility we must focus on individual agents since individuals, not
processes, can be the subject of responsibility claims. They are the ones who, under
the header of RRI, should ‘‘either feel responsible, or can be held or can be made
responsible’’ for the course of innovation processes (Van den Hoven 2013, 81).
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate the responsibilities of individual
researchers in RRI. We argue that, for engineers and scientists to successfully
implement RRI, they have a duty to collectivize and must develop organizations to
facilitate RRI since this is so difficult for individual agents to achieve on their own.
We use nanotechnology as a case study to develop our argument, in part because the
National Nanotechnology Initiative in the United States has identified supporting
the responsible development of nanotechnology as one of its four primary goals. We
focus on the nanotechnology field at the University of California, Berkeley (UC
Berkeley), a world leader in nanotechnological research. We first explore how the
emerging and enabling nature of nanotechnology makes it difficult for individual
researchers to contribute to RRI. We examine how the limited individual capacity of
researchers to control and foresee nanotechnological development impedes the
allocation of responsibility. Next, we argue that there is no collective agent within
the nanotechnology field that could be capable of RRI. Then, we turn to a more
theoretical discussion on how the dispersed nature of the nanotechnology field
impacts individual responsibility. We develop a set of criteria to argue that
researchers involved in nanotechnology have a duty to collectivize, to organize
themselves into a collective that can innovate responsibility. This framework offers
a new perspective on individual responsibility for RRI.
Research Approach
This paper is the product of a collaborative study, or rather a collaborative
reflection, on the ethical dimensions of nanotechnologies. From the summer of 2013
to the spring of 2015, a group consisting of two PhD students in engineering from
the UC Berkeley and one PhD student in ethics from Delft University of
Technology participated in the jointly organized program ‘Global Perspectives:
Engineering Ethics Across International and Academic Borders’ (Sunderland et al.
2014). During this program, the authors were sensitized to each other’s work and
encouraged to come up with joint research projects, using collaboration as a form of
research (Calvert 2014).
Nanotechnologies are a central theme in the work of all three the authors, though
GH and DR are involved in it from an engineering perspective and SS from an
ethical perspective. We easily engaged in discussions concerning ethical issues in
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engineering work; however how to operationalize ethics in nanoscience and
technology was not at all obvious. For instance, after reading nanoethics texts for the
Global Perspectives program, GH and DR felt the field was often too speculative and
inclusive of non-nanotechnologies. We all experienced the field as ambiguously
defined and found its terminology heavily skewed by the external pressures of
funding and networking activities (Nordmann 2007). Furthermore, little work
seemed to address DR’s immediate concerns about nanotechnologies, such as the use
and risks of nanomaterials in working environments and the effect of nanoparticles
on the environment. At the other end of the spectrum, SS was surprised by how little
room was reserved for discussions of such topics within daily research practices at
UC Berkeley. Along the way we realized that, for engineers and ethicists to find each
other’s work relevant, it is critical to develop a shared understanding of what the field
of nanotechnology entails as well as what responsibilities come with being a member
of the nanotechnology community. This paper is a first attempt to develop such a
shared understanding, and can be read as a self-reflection and a result of the position
that we take within the field: PhD researchers.
The empirical sections of this paper are based on the local contexts of UC
Berkeley, and describe the academic setting experienced by GH and DR. UC
Berkeley is an academic leader in nanotechnology with over 100 faculty across ten
departments researching in this area. That said, we think our analysis is generally
representative; we take it that the dispersed structure around nanotechnology
research is fairly representative of the way nanoengineering research is conducted at
top research institutions in the United States and sheds light on the more general
topic of how converging fields with no clear and monolithic institutional space (such
as a stand-alone department) impede individual responsibility-taking.
Responsible Research and Innovation in Nanotechnology
In 2000, Bill Clinton launched the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), a
research program devoted to advancing understanding and control of matter at the
nanoscale (Sargent 2014). Since then, the United States federal government has
invested $19.4 billion in the program. The initiative has led to a wide range of
innovations, ranging from breakthroughs in battery technology to nanoscale
transistors. Nanotechnology may be thought of as a range of tools that enable
advancements in other fields, including biology, electrical engineering, materials
science, and physics. Nanotechnologies are of great interest to scientists and
engineers because the physical nature of matter and energy changes as we reach the
nanoscale. When matter is constrained to the scale of nanometers in at least one
dimension, roughly 10-9 m, it exhibits novel physical, electrical, and optical
properties. The most notable of these changes is the presence of quantum effects
that cannot be seen in larger materials. These properties allow scientists and
engineers to create improvements across disciplines such as surface interactions,
molecular biology, semiconductor physics, and microfabrication. Nanotechnology
research extends from fundamental science to consumer applications, which makes
it difficult to develop an overall approach for enabling nanotechnological
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researchers to evaluate and address the ethical risks posed by their work. This is
particularly true for researchers of fundamental nanoscale physics and cutting-edge
nanofabrication technologies. Research in these fields seeks to understand the
physical phenomena and fabrication techniques that may later serve as tools for a
wide range of disciplines. These approaches are often implemented into applications
that the initial researcher had never imagined.
One of the four stated goals of the NNI program is to ‘‘support responsible
development of nanotechnology’’ (National Science and Technology Council 2014;
34). While this seems to suggest that nanotechnology is a uniform and distinct field,
posing a unique set of ethical concerns, in practice, nanotechnological research is
interdisciplinary, dispersed, with many actors and structures governing the funding
of and research in this field. Nanotechnology research has advanced widely, but
only a single major research institution (UC San Diego) has created a stand-alone
nanotechnology department. Elsewhere, researchers are spread across many
departments based on the applications of their nanotechnological research. So most
nanotechnological research exists within an application discipline. This structural
arrangement facilitates collaboration between experts in nanotechnology and
experts in application fields. Interactions between actors within nanotechnology
are limited to more informal structures such as shared research spaces, funding
initiatives, seminar groups, and certificate programs. In practice, this limits the
forums for nanotechnological researchers to discuss ethical responsibilities that may
be unique to nanotechnology. Thus the key question is: given the state of the
nanotechnology community, how can individual researchers achieve the NNI’s goal
of supporting responsible development of nanotechnology?
Limitations on the Capacity of Individual Researchers to Steer
Nanotechnological Development
By working with materials and devices at the nanoscale, scientists and engineers are
able to make significant advances in a wide range of industries, including drug
delivery, transportation, weaponry, and microprocessors (Lin and Allhof 2007).
Here we argue that this structure makes it challenging for individual researchers to
steer nanotechnological development, because it impedes their capacity to control
and foresee how nanotechnologies will be developed and applied.
A key characteristic of nanoscience and nanotechnologies is that they play an
enabling role in other fields. The enabling effects of nanotechnology can be broken
down into two basic categories: sustaining innovations and disruptive innovations.
Computer processors are an excellent example of how nanotechnology enables
sustaining innovation. In 1965, Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, predicted that
the number of transistors on a computer processor would double every 2 years.
Maintaining this pace over the last five decades has forced engineers to constantly
find ways to reduce the size of transistors. Without the enabling effects of
nanotechnology, Moore’s law would have failed long ago. While the process for
making computer components has not fundamentally changed, the ability to
manufacture at smaller and smaller sizes has made new chipsets possible. In other
fields nanotechnology has acted as a disruptive innovation, enabling previously
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inconceivable discoveries. Biological systems are inherently nanostructured and
nanofunctional, so the advent of nanotechnology allows for a literal quantum leap in
medical systems. Some of the most promising early applications of nanomedicine
have come in the realm of drug delivery. Polymer-drug nanoparticles and nanodrug
delivery devices with variable diffusivity allow drugs to be delivered to targeted
regions of the body (LaVan et al. 2003). In applications such as anti-cancer drugs,
such technology could target tumors while protecting healthy cells from toxic
exposure. Nanotechnology has also allowed for the synthesis of tissues that might
1 day become implantable organs (Griffith and Naughton 2002).
A consequence of developing an enabling technology is that inventors must
relinquish control of their inventions to those who use the technology. The
emergence of nanoscience and nanotechnology has created, and continues to create,
opportunities for research and technological development beyond the scope of the
nanotechnology community. The capacity of individual scientists and engineers to
steer or adjust nanotechnological developments is strongly determined by their
influence on the fields in which their technologies are going to be applied. Although
most nanotechnological research occurs in a university setting, the resulting ideas
are commercialized by corporate entities that license the intellectual property. In
such cases the capacity of the basic researcher to influence nanotechnological
applications could be even more limited.
Furthermore, as researchers in nanotechnology do groundbreaking work they
may be unwittingly laying the scientific framework on which applications will later
be based. In a way these nanotechnologies are like hammers looking for nails; their
effects only materialize because of their enabling effects. Researchers may have a
particular application in mind during the development phase, but often it is the
unexpected or unanticipated discovery that produces the most interesting technol-
ogy. Consider the case of quantum dots. Energy level confinement was first
discovered in 1974, with the name ‘quantum dot’ first applied in 1988 (Reed et al.
1988). Forty years later, the initial discovery has led to transistors, solar cells, LEDs,
and diode lasers. In 2013, a flat-panel television became the first example of a
commercial technology incorporating quantum dots (Bullis 2013). Nearly 40 years
passed before the initial innovation resulted in a commercial application.
Consequently, it seems unreasonable to expect individual researchers to bear the
responsibility and to be able to steer nanotechnological trajectories resulting from
their enabling work. Scientists and engineers working on nanotechnology are only
able to oversee a relatively small part of the innovation process. This is, of course,
not a new critique; a similar argument has been made by Swierstra and Jelsma who
render individual accountability for technological development problematic because
of the collaborative nature of science (Swierstra and Jelsma 2006). Parallels can also
be drawn with discussions of ‘many hands problems’ in engineering contexts, in
which a group of actors cause harm through their combined behaviors rather than
individual wrongdoing. In such cases the distribution of labor also means that
individuals lack the capacity to prevent major harm single-handedly.
While the challenges of steering technological trajectories are indisputable, does
this absolve enabling scientists and engineers of all moral responsibility for how
their technology is used? We think not, since nanotechnology researchers have still
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contributed to the innovation processes, even though their individual impact takes
place over large spans of time. In a sense, individual researchers share a
responsibility with all those involved in nanotechnological developments. While
they may not be individually responsible, by contributing to a shared innovation
trajectory they seem to play a part in a larger collective that may be a reasonable
candidate for bearing this forward-looking responsibility (Miller 2006). Next, we
will explore the extent to which the nanotechnology community as a whole could
serve as a vehicle for allocating forward-looking responsibility to individuals.
The Problem with Defining a Collective Agent in the Nanotechnology Field
We have concluded that, if we want nanotechnology to be developed responsibly,
individual researchers must in some sense share this responsibility with others
involved in the nanotechnology research and development process. Because of their
higher level of organization, such groups of people may constitute a collective that
can bear forward-looking responsibility. Collective agents are generally distin-
guished from mere aggregates of people acting in parallel by (1) the existence of
some sort of group decision mechanism, (2) the achievement of, or aspiration to
achieve, certain common aims, and (3) the assignment of roles and tasks to group
members in order to achieve those aims (Collins 2012; Pettit and Schweikard 2006).
Given the fact that individual researchers have a limited capacity to act, this section
will explore the extent to which the field of nanotechnology constitutes a collective
or group agent structure with the capacity to steer nanotechnological development.
Nanotechnology is a highly interdisciplinary field; scientists in many fields have
sought and found ways to understand, manipulate and create matter at the
nanometer scale. As many nanotechnologies are broadly applicable, one of the other
ways nanoscientists and nanoengineers interact is around particular research thrusts.
Consider again the example of quantum dots. These dots are a topic of study for
many researchers at UC Berkeley, including physicists, chemists, materials
scientists, and engineers. Among them are Stephen R. Leone, Professor of
Chemistry and Physics, and Paul Alivisatos, Professor of Chemistry and Materials
Science & Engineering, who have been cross-appointed to a total of four different
departments, illustrating how their research transcends traditional disciplines.
Professor Leone’s research page lists a wide array of topics relating to physics and
chemistry, including ‘‘ultrafast laser investigations and soft x-ray probing of valence
and core levels’’ and ‘‘nanoparticle fluorescence intermittency’’ (Department of
Chemistry 2014a, b). Professor Alivisatos’ biography states that his ‘‘research
concerns the structural, thermodynamic, optical, and electrical properties of
colloidal inorganic nanocrystals’’ (Department of Chemistry 2014a). Despite
different research thrusts, both professors are interested in quantum dots. They
have independently published several papers concerning quantum dots and have
also collaborated on one publication (Vura-Weis et al. 2013).
While these two researchers and their research groups are certainly part of a
community, they are housed in different departments and pursue different research
goals. They do not seem to meet the definition of a collective agent. Unlike
computer science or electrical engineering, nanoengineering is not its own
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discipline, with a common sense of direction, such as the build up of a shared
methodology and body of knowledge. At UC Berkeley the footprint of the
nanotechnology collaboration is literally spread over the entire campus. There are
over 100 faculty working in nanoscience and nanotechnology, with a multitude of
different research thrusts, centers, and collaborations. While describing the full
network of actors is beyond the scope of this paper, Fig. 1 gives an overview of the
complexity of the network.
In terms of distributing roles or providing a shared decision-making procedure
needed for collective agency, the community of scientists and engineers involved in
nanoscience and engineering is not a strong organizing force. Researchers involved
in nanotechnological development are not part of an institutional framework
comparable to those offered by professional organizations in other engineering
fields. The UC Berkeley-based Berkeley Nanoscience and Nanotechnology
Initiatives (BNNI) aims to be ‘‘the umbrella organization for expanding and
coordinating Berkeley research and educational activities in nanoscale science and
engineering’’ (BNNI 2007; see Fig. 1). The organization’s website lists researchers
working on topics ranging from nanomanufacturing, quantum information and
computers to analytical biotechnology. While the BNNI provides a framework for
collaboration at UC Berkeley, participation in the nanotechnology community is
largely voluntary. Faculty members belong to a home department, such as materials
science, but do not share a common nanoengineering department and may choose to
participate in some or none of BNNI’s activities. In practice, the type of informal
interaction between Leone and Alivisatos discussed above is exemplary for the
nanotechnology community at UC Berkeley.1
Although nanotechnology researchers are unified by the fact that they have all
found different ways to understand, manipulate, and/or create matter at the
nanometer scale, this does not mean that they can be regarded as one collective or
one professional group. The ad-hoc nature of the field of nanoscience and
nanotechnology, with its fluid boundaries and elusive membership, does not
establish a collective agent through which scientists and engineers could steer
technological development together in light of any unwanted outcomes of
nanotechnological innovation.2 This causes a paradoxical situation, in which
individual researchers cannot innovate responsibly purely by themselves, while
1 The absence of a professional nanoengineering identity is confirmed by the absence of a stand-alone
nanoengineering undergraduate or doctoral program. The BNNI organizes a designated emphasis in
Nanoscale Science and Engineering for PhD students. UC Berkeley defines a designated emphasis as ‘‘an
area of study constituting a new method of inquiry or an important field of application relevant to two or
more existing doctoral degree programs. It is not a free-standing degree program, but must be added as an
additional major along with an existing doctoral degree program’’ (BNNI 2014).
2 Currently, much of the ethical debate about nanotechnologies takes place outside of the nanotechnology
community, in applied ethics or social scientific journals, such as the journal NanoEthics. Alongside the
development of scientific advances in nanotechnology has come extensive research into the ethical
aspects of nanotechnology, specifically in the field of nanoethics, and more generally in STS and
engineering ethics. Discussions concerning nanotechnology have ranged from debates on practical
considerations related to chemical hygiene to dystopian scenes of world destruction (Drexler 1986;
Gordijn 2005; Lin and Allhof 2007). However, many of the findings that SS shared from her field of
ethical inquiry were novel to DG and DR.
878 S. L. Spruit et al.
123
Fig. 1 Overview ofNanoscience andNanotechnology atUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeley.On top you can
find the shared facilities that fall under the header of nanotechnology (on top) such as the Marvell Nanolab
discussed in the text. The academic departments involved in the Berkeley Nanosciences and
Nanoengineering institute are listed at the bottom. On the left several specialized research centers are
listed (in counter-clockwise order); The Berkeley Quantum Information and Computation Center (BQIC),
The Cell Propulsion Lab (CPL), Center for Analytical Biotechnology (CAB), Western Institute of
Nanoelectronics (WIN), a DARPAfunded research center in nano-opto-electronics (CONSRT), Berkeley
Sensor and Actuator Center (BSAC), the Center for Scalable and Integrated Nanomanufacturing (SINAM)
and Center of Integrated Nanomechanical Systems (COINS). On the right handside you can find The
Nanotechnology club, which organizes events for graduate students and undergraduates to educated them
about nanotechnology. The graduate nanotechnology group directs the special emphasis in nanotechnology
that is part of doctoral education, and is responsible for crosslisting classes in theDepartment ofNanoscience
and Engineering (which has no professors, labs or majors). The nanotechnology exchange is an industrial
outreach program, that lets corporate sponsors find research and labs that they are interested in
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there is also no structural framework to ensure that responsible development of
nanotechnologies takes place.
Reframing the Responsibility of Nanotechnology Researchers as a Duty
to Collectivize
The nanotechnology field clearly poses a problem for RRI. While RRI requires
some sort of synchronized action, this is challenging due to the dispersed nature of
the field. It has been convincingly argued, however, that this does not provide
sufficient reason for scientists and engineers to avoid or be excused from
responsibility (Davis 2012). Nanotechnology researchers are not just a cog in the
machine; they are integral contributors to the invention of nanotechnologies. This
section explores a solution to this paradoxical situation, by arguing that these
researchers may have a duty to collectivize.
Unorganized groups of people pose a problem for allocating responsibility. In the
previous section we saw that the level of organization and distribution of roles, the
presence of a shared decision-making structure, and shared aims all play a role in
determining whether or not we can consider a group a collective agent. We do not
presuppose a holistic definition of a group agent. In our view a group is basically an
organized set of individuals. Our goal is not to focus on the ontological
underpinnings of collective agents. Instead we depart from a fairly uncontroversial
assumption that a group’s level of coherence and structure influences the extent to
which that group of people can be expected, within reason, to be responsible for the
behaviors of other group members. Even if no clear group agent exists, we may have
the intuition that some sort of shared responsibility is in place. Held (1991) argues
that groups that lack the structural organization needed in order to be considered an
agent can sometimes be held accountable for collective omissions. For instance,
consider strangers on the beach who are confronted with somebody drowning.
These strangers have a certain obligation to work together to save the individual
from drowning. In such cases we may not hold individuals accountable for the
drowning person, but, as Held argues, we would blame these groups of bystanders
for not teaming up to save the drowning person. This implies that a random
collection of bystanders may perhaps not be a collective agent in the strict sense
(having a shared decision-making structure or structural organization), but as group
of individuals they have some sort of collective capacity to act.
Collins (2012) builds on Held’s idea and proposes a more formalized account of
the intuition that, in some cases, individuals have a responsibility to create a
collective agent. In short, Collins argues that, in cases where there is a morally
pressing issue that could be resolved by a group, but no group agent exists to resolve
it, individual agents may have a duty to create a group, a collective agent, that is
capable of resolving the issue concerned (Collins 2012). For this duty to collectivize
to apply, Collins suggests the following Criteria for Collectivization Duties (CCD),
which we will discuss and apply to the context of nanotechnology research (CCD-
Nano).
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Criteria for Collectivization Duties
Collins starts off with five conditions that describe the situations in which
collectivization duties are invoked. The first condition defines the moral problem at
hand: ‘‘/ is morally pressing’’ (Collins 2012, 244), which means that there is an
activity /, that must be performed because it is morally valuable in itself or because
it brings about a certain morally desirable outcome. In the debates concerning RRI
we can recognize both meanings of morally pressing: the incorporation of multiple
values into science and engineering is seen as a democratic goal in itself, while it
would also lead to the development of technologies that are socially and
environmentally acceptable. This then leads to a reformulation of this criterion
that overlaps with the stated goal of the NNI: Responsible Research and Innovation
of nanotechnology is morally pressing.
The next condition declares that there is nobody, either an individual person or a
collective, who actually has a duty to perform the activity / (in our case:
responsible development) that would bring about desirable outcomes: ‘‘at t1, either:
no (collective or individual) agent/s have duties, either to / or to take responsive
actions with a view to there being the morally desirable outcome that / produces; or
too many agent/s with such duties default’’ (Collins 2012, 244). Two kinds of duties
are mentioned in this condition. The first is a direct duty to / and the second is a
duty to take responsive actions to /, thus a duty to contribute to / taking place. We
interpreted the first direct duty as the duty of RRI, for which we know there are no
individuals who can do this independently, and for which there is also no clearly
identifiable collective agent. The second duty to ‘‘take responsive steps towards /’’
implies that agents can take independent steps that lead to the performance of action
/, meaning individual scientists and engineers or groups of people whose combined
activities lead to responsible nanotechnological development. Based on this we
propose the following reformulation of Collins second criterion: ‘‘there are no
individual researchers or group agents, such as professional organizations or
authorities, that bear the duty of RRI, or take independent steps that would lead to
RRI, or too many agents with such duties default.’’ The third criterion relies on a
counterfactual conditional, deriving a duty to create a collective from the statement
that a collective would be able to bear a duty once it exists: ‘‘if, at t1, [individual
agents] A, …, N each took responsive steps towards there being a collective-that
can-/, then, at t2, that collective would incur a duty to /’’ (Collins 2012, 244). So, if
individual researchers took steps towards forming a collective agent that can
responsibly develop nanotechnology than that collective agent would be bestowed
with a duty to develop responsibly. Collins does not elaborate on the normative
basis for this duty; why it would suddenly emerge once the collective exists. We
choose to interpret this as a duty derived from the collective’s capacity to act; since
a collective would be able to facilitate responsible development of nanotechnology,
this collective would bear this obligation. As this may seem a heavy burden, we will
discuss this obligation in more detail in the next section. The reformulation of this
criterion becomes: ‘‘if researchers organized themselves into a collective that can do
RRI, then this collective, once established, would have a duty of RRI.’’
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The fourth criterion sets limits on the burden that may rest on individual agents to
organize themselves: ‘‘at t1, [individual agents] A, …, N are each able to take
responsive steps towards there being a collective-that-can-/ at a reasonable
expected personal and moral cost.’’ We translated this into: ‘‘researchers involved in
nanotechnology development are able to take steps towards organizing themselves
without considerable personal and moral costs,’’ limiting the demanding nature of
the collectivization duty for individual researchers.
The fifth criterion states that ‘‘other individuals will not successfully take
responsive steps towards there being a collective that will incur a stronger duty to /
.’’ The key idea here is that an individual’s collectivization duty is contingent upon
the activities of other individuals, who, if they collectivized (a) would fulfill the
morally desirable activity, and (b) would as a collective have a stronger duty to /
than other collectives. Collins does not specify what constitutes a stronger duty to /
for collectives. However, given the action-oriented nature of Collins proposal we
assume that collectives with a stronger capacity to / would have a stronger duty to
/. Other considerations could also play a role in determining the strength of this
collectivization duty. An example is the extent to which the collective has benefited
from the situation in which the morally pressing issue emerged. This will be
addressed in more detail in the discussion. We propose the following formulation:
‘‘there is no reason to believe that other individuals will collectivize into a group
that would have a stronger duty to do RRI.’’
If these five criteria are met, then this would give individual agents a duty to
collectivize, meaning that: ‘‘at t1, [individual agents] A, …, N each have a duty to
take responsive steps towards there being a collective-that-can-/,’’ which means
that individual researchers have to take steps towards organizing themselves into a
collective that can develop a mechanism for responsible innovation. Once such a
collective is formed, it has a duty to facilitate responsible innovation. As follows
from the translation of Collins’ seventh CCD: ‘‘at t2, once a {A, …, N} collective-
that-can-/ is formed, that collective has a duty to /.’’ This is essentially a
confirmation of the third criterion in the antecedent. Next: ‘‘at t3, once the collective
has distributed /-related roles, each member with a /-related role has a duty to
perform that role’’ (Collins 2012, 244). Once a collective is formed with the aim of
developing responsible innovation methods, and all of the individual researchers
understand their roles within this collective, the individual researchers have a duty
to perform their individual roles.
This leads to the nanotechnology-adjusted version of Collins proposal for
collectivization duties: CCD-Nano:
If:
(1) RRI of nanotechnology is morally pressing, and
(2) there are no individual researchers or group agents, such as professional
organizations or authorities, that bear the duty of RRI, or take independent
steps that would lead to RRI, or too many agents with such duties default, and
(3) researchers organize themselves into a collective that can do RRI, and this
collective, once established, would have a duty to do RRI, and
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(4) researchers involved in nanotechnology are able to take steps towards
organizing themselves without considerable personal and moral costs, and
(5) there is no reason to believe that other individuals will collectivize into a
group that would have a stronger duty to do RRI
then:
(6) individual researchers have to take steps towards organizing themselves into a
collective that can do RRI, and
(7) once this collective is formed, it has a duty to do RRI, and
(8) once this collective has distributed roles to individual researchers, each
member has to perform his or her individual roles
This idea of collectivization duties fundamentally shifts the discussion about how
to implement RRI in the case of nanotechnology. Rather than focusing on particular
harmful impacts and risk impositions that may be difficult to prevent due to limited
power or ignorance concerning future developments, it presents something that is
within reach of individual researchers: the duty to organize themselves. Researchers
at all levels in nanotechnology have the individual agency to contribute to this goal,
though their activities depend on their position and power within the field (as
secured in criterion 4). Individuals know how to create structures and procedures
and allocate tasks to create a collective, which can in turn ensure that technological
development proceeds in a responsible manner.3 Similar work was done during the
nascent years of computer science. Individuals in this group collectivized in order to
form a new professionalism in their field. They formulated codes of practice and
ethical guidelines to describe acceptable ways of practicing software engineering
(Gotterbarn 1997). If our argument holds, individuals who take adequate responsive
action with a view to creating a collective would be taking an irresponsible moral
risk.
Discussion: Challenges in Applying the Duty to Collectivize
in the Nanotechnology Context
Before we can unambiguously apply the criteria for collectivization duties that we
modified for the nanotechnology context (CCD-Nano), there are some challenges to
overcome. Only then can we use CCD-Nano to establish whether researchers
working on nanotechnologies have a duty to collectivize. We will discuss these
challenges with a view to improving our approach for future use.
The first objection one could raise to a collectivization duty in nanotechnology is
that it is unclear when an issue is morally pressing enough to justify a need for
forward-looking responsibility. Held’s example of a person drowning seems
3 The result of this may be alliances with people external to the research field (like the alliance between
the authors of this paper), such as nanoethicists who help analyze what responsible development of
nanotechnologies actually entails.
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morally clear; it is obvious that some sort of action would have to be taken in life or
death situations. Something similar can be said for preventing known risks. We can
reasonably expect a certain duty to prevent health and environmental risks or
negative social impacts. This would, of course, be proportional to the magnitude and
likelihood of that particular risk. In the case of uncertain risks, however, this is
much more difficult. In the case of nanotechnology, something may have the
potential to cause harm due to unforeseen technological developments, but we have
no certainty about what exact threats may emerge and no way of calculating
probabilities of these events occurring. In such cases a duty to take action is much
harder to justify.
Therefore, the key to developing CCD-Nano is to reflect on what would
constitute a sufficient reason to expect people to organize themselves. Which
concerns warrant collectivization duties and which do not? One way of addressing
this issue in the case of nanotechnology could be to take the precautionary principle
as an indication of the urgency of the matter. Several scholars have argued in favor
of a precautionary approach to uncertain nanotechnological risks (Ahteensu and
Sandin 2012; Spruit 2015; Weckert and Moor 2007). This means that when there is
reason to expect potential harmful impacts, but solid scientific risk information is
lacking, precautions would have to be taken to prevent further harm. If invoking the
precautionary principle is seen as a way of establishing the urgency of a matter, this
would demonstrate that the nanotechnology field is morally pressing enough to
justify a duty to collectivize, or at least to meet criterion 1 of CCD-Nano.
Another issue that emerges is the demarcation of the collection of individuals
who have collectivization duties. Who should organize themselves or, in Collins’
terms, who are agents A through N that have to collectivize? We have deliberately
avoided talking about ‘nanoengineers’ in this paper as it is quite difficult to
demarcate this group. The nanotechnology label is often applied to make research
more appealing to funding agencies or publishers, but the individuals using the label
do not identify themselves as members of a nanotechnology community.
Conversely, some researchers working on nanotechnology eschew the label
entirely, believing it to be irrelevant. For example, during the [Anonymized for
review] program [Anonymized for review], one faculty speaker at UC Berkeley
explicitly did not refer to himself as a nanoengineer, even though he was working at
the nanoscale, because he thought it was a useless category. This demonstrates that
actors may not feel part of this community at all, even though they may do
technically similar work, simply because they label their work differently.
However, the ambiguity of the nanotechnology label is no excuse to avoid
responsibility. Researchers in the field of nanotechnology may be what May and
Hoffman call a ‘putative group’, a group of people that could organize themselves
once they recognize that they share responsibilities (May and Hoffman 1991; Ch. 6).
Fortunately, Collins’ proposal is not contingent upon the recognition of a shared
identity, but on the recognition of a shared problem. Collins argues in a
consequentialist fashion that those people who ‘‘are each able to take responsive
steps towards there being a collective-that-can-u’’ (Collins 2012, 244) are our
target group, the bearers of collectivization duties. The idea is that those people who
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can reliably establish an effective group—a group that can reliably perform the
morally pressing action—should be expected to organize themselves.
This demarcation based on an efficacy argument is appealing but brings us to a
third challenge: how do we know a collective will reliably ensure RRI? Given that it
is a key feature of this technological domain that uncertainty and unpredictability
impede the construction of adequate risk management strategies, the question
remains how one would know beforehand if a collective of researchers can
effectively steer technological development and do RRI. The efficacy criterion is
underdetermined in this sense. A suggestion could be to add a fairness criterion to
the efficacy criterion that is common in consequentialist notions of responsibility, as
suggested by Doorn (2012). Many individual scientists and engineers benefit from
using the ambiguous ‘nanotechnology’ as a label. It provides them with access to
funds and resources. It is not a new idea that such a benefit of membership in a
particular group could also give rise to responsibilities towards that group (May and
Hoffman 1991). Funding may provide a discerning criterion to distinguish between
all individual researchers who can collectivize and those who have a duty to
collectivize because of the benefits they got from the ‘nanotechnology’ label.
Conclusion
In this paper we established the conditions under which individual researchers have
a duty to collectivize in order for research and innovation to be done responsibly.
We focused on the field of nanotechnology—specifically on the research setting at
UC Berkeley—in order to understand how individual capacity to do RRI is limited,
especially in the absence of a collective that can provide a framework for RRI. As
an answer to this situation we have proposed a conception of individual
responsibility in RRI based on a duty to collectivize. We have explored how this
could be a fruitful approach for nanotechnology while acknowledging there are still
hurdles to overcome, namely: deciding what concerns provide sufficient grounds to
expect people to collectivize, determining the reasons to demarcate groups of
individuals who should constitute the collective, and establishing whether a
collective can be expected to do RRI in a reliable manner.
We expect our approach to be valuable not only in discussions concerning
responsibility in the nanotechnology field. Other emerging and converging research
fields will face similar struggles in establishing a professional and ethical identity.
Especially in the early days of a new field of science and engineering, the ethical
concerns and fears that emerge may have to be dealt with quickly and adequately.
Our proposal for the duty of collectivization encourages individuals to build
structures that can steer technological development in directions that make a
positive contribution to our world, while maintaining a situation in which this new
field of research and innovation can flourish.
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